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# THE JUNKER WAR.

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**Who began the War.**
**Why the War was Made.**
**What the End will be.**

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# THE JUNKER WAR.

## Who began the War.

## Why the War was Made.

AND

## What the End will be.

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# I. Who Made the War?

Who is the incendiary that has set Europe in a blaze?

This was the amazed question asked all over the world. And at once the eyes of all people were turned towards Berlin. With significant unanimity the fingers of all men began to point at William II, King of Prussia and German Emperor.

There was good reason for this prompt impeachment. It is true that Austria-Hungary took the initiative, issued an arrogant ultimatum to Servia, and made an attack upon Belgrade before diplomacy could intervene with peaceful effect.

But no one was misled by this domineering initiative. Everyone knew that the statesmen of the Ballplatz in Vienna must have submitted this ultimatum to Berlin before it was launched. It must have been approved, therefore, by the German Emperor, who is his own foreign secretary, before it was launched against Servia.

Nor was it conceivable that the effects of such an ultimatum, followed by the attack on Bel-

grade at the briefest interval, would be hidden from the German Emperor. He must have known beyond all doubt that this high-handed action on the part of Austria-Hungary was a sharp challenge to Russia; a challenge that involved war with Russia, and with France her ally.

The German Emperor must have known these things. He must have known that Austria-Hungary was carrying a lighted torch into a powder magazine. Did he remonstrate? Did he dissuade? Did he take instant and effective means to extinguish the torch?

He has professed to have done so. He has claimed before all the world, and particularly before the German people, to have played the part of peacemaker. But in the White Paper as published by our Foreign Office, and in the published correspondence between the German Emperor and the Emperor of Russia, there is no real evidence of peace-making; the words are peaceful, but not the actions.

There was clear justice, therefore, in the prompt verdict that the German Emperor was the incendiary. No one doubts, or can doubt, that he had it in his power to quench the blaze before it spread. But that, apparently, was not his intention or desire. On the contrary, the evidence accumulates that, for purposes of his own, he proceeded consciously and deliberately

to set Europe in a blaze. This, we believe, will be the verdict of history.

But it does not tell the whole story. Great as is the responsibility of the German Emperor, he is not alone responsible. The German people must take their share. No doubt there are people who say that Germany, as a nation, had no part in making this war; that it was conceived by the bureaucrats at the Wilhelmstrasse, and it is being executed by the military caste from Potsdam, with the approval of the Emperor. The heart of the German people, it is averred, is not in this criminal war.

It would be a relief to men of good will to believe that this is true. But is it true? Did the people in the great cities of Germany protest against the crime of creating an Armageddon? Did the business men, the cultured classes, the university professors, raise their voices against this war? Did the Socialists in the Reichstag, even, express their condemnation?

On the contrary. All the evidence available goes to show that, whatever may emerge before the end, this war was popular with the German people at its beginning. True, they were annoyed against Italy for being neutral, and surprised into a great resentment that Great Britain had taken sides with the enemy. Our turn was to come later. But in declaring war against Russia, and then against France, the

German Emperor had the support of his people. Not all his people, perhaps, but all who counted, all who were vocal. The war, in brief, was popular in Germany.

Nor is that, when you consider it, a matter for surprise. Since the Franco-German War of 1870, a united Germany, under the leadership of Prussia, has considered itself the dominant Power in Europe, so far as an army can ensure dominance. This claim of dominance, based upon an alleged superiority of all kinds, has been sedulously instilled into the German people, as a thing belonging to them by natural right. In their schools, their universities, their newspapers, their literature, the teaching has been given, the assumption has been made, that Germany dominated because she was fitted to dominate. Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles.

This needs explanation. For there are very many Germans, some of whom we may have known, who were quite simple, friendly, easy-going folk; the very last kind of people to assert themselves unduly, or to trample upon their neighbours. And the explanation is this: as noted above, Germany has been under the direct leadership of Prussia since the war of 1870. This explains much; under a searching scrutiny it will be found to explain, as nothing else can explain, the genesis of the present unprecedented war.

For this, like every other war, is an expression of human nature; and in this case it is Prussian human nature. Not an essentially bad type of character the Prussian, in its original form, and when Prussia was a poor, struggling, agricultural country. On its upper side the Prussian character exhibits a thrift, orderliness, hard-working pertinacity and patriotism which are altogether commendable. It has carried this northern kingdom far. Under the patriotic leading of Stein and Hardenburg an army was created which assisted in no small degree, and finally at Waterloo, to break the power of Napoleon.

But the Prussian character has also its under side. Especially when found in the land-owning class, the Prussian Junkers, this under side is far from being commendable; it is, on the contrary, distinctly intolerable. On this side of his character the Prussian is ambitious, unscrupulous, ruthless; above all he has a passion for ruling. The Prussians rule themselves in every small detail of their civic and national life; and they have fattened the belief, born of three successful wars—in 1864, 1866, and 1870—that they have been divinely ordained to rule or dominate throughout Europe.

That is the Junker attitude towards their neighbours, and it is inspired by the Junker spirit. In their most successful form, raised to

the point of genius, the Prussian method and the Prussian spirit were seen in Bismarck and Moltke. The one was the head, so to say, and the other was the hand; the one conceived a plan and the other brought it to a successful issue; and both the statesman and the soldier were steadily ambitious, unscrupulous and ruthless. Super-Junkers both of them.

It is upon this foundation that modern Germany was built. The particular ambition of Bismarck was to form a confederation of the German States—a German Empire—with Prussia as the managing partner exercising a predominating influence, and with the King of Prussia as the outward and visible sign of this predominance. He had his way, but not without trouble, not without protest from the South German kingdoms. Bismarck gained his end; William I of Prussia was crowned at Versailles, during the siege of Paris, as the first German Emperor.

And from that war of 1870 to the present war of 1914, the Junker ambitions, the Junker methods, the Junker spirit, have been made to permeate and predominate throughout the whole of Germany. There have been protests in various forms and at various times. The socialism of Germany is not alone theoretical; it is very largely practical; and it maintains itself in a widespread form, at election times

especially, as an impatient protest against Junkerism. Also it is a notorious fact that the South Germans—the Bavarians, the Badeners —are on the north side of friendship with the Prussians.

At the same time it has to be recognised that the German people, as a whole, have been infected with the Junker spirit. They found it everywhere—in the schools, the universities, the newspapers; above all, and in its most potent forms, Junkerism has flourished among the German official classes, and in the army and navy. The army especially; for the tap-root of the Junker spirit is to be found in the German army. At Potsdam this tap-root was watered and tended with the greatest care. The German army was invincible; the German army was over all.

And the whole of young Germany—except a small minority—have been brought in their most impressionable years under the discipline, the traditions, the teachings, of this army. The young German might hate the goose-step, the drudgery, the drill-sergeant martinets of the military system. But he could not escape being infected by its spirit. The army appealed to his patriotism, he believed that it was invincible, and he acquired the habit of thinking that, as the War Lord of Potsdam and his army ruled Germany, it was logically accurate to say that

Germany could rule the world. To think that it ought to rule the world was only another step in this logical sequence.

There is another thing. It has been carefully instilled into the German mind that the other Powers of Europe were envious of the great and expanding success of modern Germany. The official Press Bureau, one of the most alert forms of activity in the Wilhelmstrasse, has been sedulous for many a year in impressing upon Germans that they were envied by other nations. This appealed to their sense of importance, and it was also employed to appeal to their pockets. For if the Junkers at Potsdam decided to have another army corps or another battle-squadron they filled the subservient newspapers with the assurances that these additions to army and navy were needed to protect the Fatherland from the envy and malice of neighbouring nations. For always these envious neighbours, England chief of all, were intriguing to hem in and to humble the German people.

It is quite true, therefore, to say that the German Emperor began this war. As the War Lord in Potsdam he had the power to say "yes" or "no." And as a Hohenzollern he inherits, what he has also cultivated, the Junker spirit of ambition, arrogance, unscrupulousness. He pressed the button to set in motion the horrible war-machine that is now devastating

Europe. That is true; and to that extent the German Emperor must bear the terrible responsibility, the ineffaceable infamy.

But it is not the whole truth. The German people have their own share, and it is a large share, in this responsibility. They have permitted Junkerism to flourish in their midst, they have bowed to its yoke, they have imbibed its spirit. When the Emperor made the call, therefore, the German people were ready to respond; they acclaimed Junkerism. The war was begun by the Emperor, the Junkers, and the German Nation.

## II. Why the War was Made.

In examining the question of who must bear the responsibility for this war we have found that it cannot be answered in one brief sentence. We have found that it is not enough to damn the German Emperor, and there make end. That is a summary and easy answer. But it is crude; still more, it is inadequate.

So with our second question: Why was the war made? It would be quite simple to say that it was made by the German Emperor in order to satisfy his inherent egotisms and ambitions. And in such an answer there would be a large element of truth. The German Emperor has always been egotistical and ambitious in a superlative degree. And a superlative egotism, when it becomes unbalanced, is capable of any crime.

But not even an Emperor can detach himself from the driving forces of his environment, and the forces in Germany that shaped towards the present war enveloped the whole nation. Not simple forces, but complex forces, arising out of national needs. Not arising from ambitions

merely and the desire for dominance, but weighted and sharpened by the growing necessities of a great modern industrial nation with a population rapidly growing. In effect, we must take into account the economic pressure in Germany if we are to understand fully why the criminal folly of this war was perpetrated.

The tap-root of it all, no doubt, was Prussian Junkerism. This crime was brought to birth by the same spirit that inspired Bismarck and Moltke to strike down, first Austria in 1866, and then France in 1870, in order that a unified Germany might be created, holding a predominant position in Central Europe. That was the ambit of the ambitions of Bismarck; ambitions which, being attained, were cautiously and sedulously restrained. With political insurances, and re-insurances, he safeguarded his beloved German Empire. Thus it stood; thus it remained secure.

But no essential change had overtaken Prussian Junkerism. It was still ambitious, cunning, ruthless; it still marked down its intended victims and prepared to destroy them at the chosen moment. If it has been affected by the boasted German culture it has only been in a superficial sense; a mere veneer. In the last quarter of a century, however, the ambitions of Junkerism have been enlarged, and taken a new objective. Under the alert supervision and

inspiration of the German Emperor, *Realpolitik* and *Weltpolitik* have indicated the scope of these ambitions.

As Bismarck had given Germany a predominant position in Central Europe, so it was the ambition of the German Emperor to make Germany the predominant Power in the world. To the British mind, no doubt, such an ambition must appear—and did appear—to be at once unattainable and ridiculous. But to the Junker mind there is nothing that presents itself as a thing unattainable, and for a sense of the ridiculous he has no use. Why should not Germany, the Junker asked himself, be the greatest Power in the world ?

And this has to be observed. If patience hard work, many sacrifices, cunning, and unscrupulousness could make Germany the greatest Power in the world, they have all been exercised in the amplest measure. That is one thing, at least, which the British people should mark, learn, and inwardly digest. If they consider it preposterous that the German Emperor and his people should desire to hold pre-eminence in the world, let it not be forgotten that they have worked hard for this ambition and made large sacrifices.

There is another thing that we might note. In shaping his ambition, in choosing his model for a great World Power, the German Emperor

looked to Great Britain. His mother was an English Princess, and he has always been a great admirer of this country; so we have been told times without number. It is easy enough to believe this when the underlying reason is understood. The Emperor has admired Great Britain because he desired to transfer the various supremacies of Great Britain to his beloved Germany, under his exalted rule. Without these supremacies, as he well understood, Germany could never be the predominant World Power.

Taking his model from Great Britain, therefore, and with his ultimate designs carefully concealed, the German Emperor has worked hard for a quarter of a century to make Germany a great Industrial, a great Colonial, and a great Naval Power, while still retaining her supremacy as the greatest Military Power. This was an immense task, you must admit, and it covered an ambition far transcending anything evolved by Bismarck or Moltke. But there it was; the evidences of it are extant; and in this task the Emperor has been handsomely assisted by the whole mobilized forces of Junkerism and of Germany.

And the results of this united, patient, unswerving effort of the whole nation to make Germany the greatest Power in the world are, indeed, wonderful results. From being a comparatively poor agricultural country Germany

has become an immense hive of industry. In the previous war with France her navy was negligible, she was dependent on Great Britain for ship-building, and her overseas commerce was a mere trifle. Now the German navy is the second largest in the world. Her shipyards have produced this navy, and if in this war her sea-power outside the North Sea and the Baltic has been quickly effaced—as it has been by Great Britain—it is because the ambitions of the New Germany have been thwarted in one important direction.

In following his British model the German Emperor has keenly desired to make his country a great Colonial Power. In this ambition he has failed, and the failure has been a galling disappointment. For two reasons. In the first place, colonial possessions, in tropical and subtropical regions, are a necessity to a modern industrial nation, both for what they produce and for what they consume. Then, again, colonial possessions are a necessity to a nation with a great navy, in so far as they provide coaling stations and naval bases. Without these overseas possessions a European navy is crippled and tethered.

Small wonder, therefore, that the German Emperor, in working out his scheme of World Power, has been galled by his ill-success in acquiring for Germany a great colonial Empire.

But this ill-success has not been due to lack of effort. In every direction, in the Old World and the New, German diplomacy, associated with German menaces, has assiduously sought to obtain colonies for the Fatherland. The results, however, have been comparatively scrappy and disappointing. Mere oddments as compared with the possessions of Great Britain. A lease-hold in China, an island in Samoa, a slice of New Guinea, and various patches in Africa on the east and west coasts, with their hinterlands. Curiously enough, the most valuable of the German possessions at the present moment—Heligoland—was an amazing gift from a British Government.

No; Germany was not successful in obtaining oversea possessions, and what she regarded as her rightful place in the sun. There were reasons. The Emperor was too late in arriving on the scene, and all the choice places were occupied. In the American Continent the United States, with their Monroe Doctrine, barred the way; while in Asia and Africa and the Islands of the Sea, practically everything valuable was in the possession either of France or Great Britain. Therefore, if Germany was to be a great World Power, bestriding the seas, she must serve herself heir to the colonial possessions of these two countries.

For the last fifteen years, at least, the whole

concentrated strength of Germany has been directed to accomplish this purpose. It was clearly revealed to us during the Boer War. Nowhere, at that time, did we encounter so much rank ill-will, such gross vilification as in Germany; nowhere was it so nakedly proclaimed, with obvious glee, that the British were a decadent race, and that the Germans were their heirs and successors. And in 1900, before the Boer War was ended, the Emperor formulated his Navy Law, and the building of the great German Navy was begun. It was this Navy—in combination with the Germany Army, and the assiduous cunning of German diplomacy—that was to be the means of making Germany the predominant World Power, with ample colonies.

Now, it has often been argued that the German Emperor must be a man of peace because, during the whole of his reign, he has not embroiled his country in a European War. The answer is simple. In the larger sense, as this war proves, the Emperor is a consummate fool of the egotistical type. But in the lesser sense, in everyday affairs, he has proved himself to be anything but a fool. And to him it must have appeared the height of folly to jeopardise the new industrial Germany of his creation until his plans to make Germany a World Power, second to none, were thoroughly matured. That is the way in Junkerdom;

a long, ardent, complete preparation, and then the swift stroke at the selected moment.

Are we to assume, then, that the German Emperor selected his moment this year, after making complete preparations? No; the facts do not warrant that assumption. It is more probably the truth that his plans have been forestalled and disarranged by various events during the last ten years, culminating in the recent two Balkan Wars. In this process of disarrangement the first place must be given to the Treaty of Agreement between France and Great Britain, signed ten years ago, and followed in three years by the Agreement between Russia and Great Britain. This constituted the Triple Entente with which the Dual Alliance is now in deadly struggle.

The Triple Entente, by its combined naval and military forces, barred the way to that colonial Empire, and World-predominance, which were the ambitious objectives of the Emperor, the Junkers, and the German people. And for ten years every effort has been made—by cunning diplomacy, by misrepresentations, now by feigning friendship, and now by rattling the sabre menacingly—to detach and destroy the barrier to German ambitions presented by the combined strength of France, Russia, and Great Britain.

On three separate occasions, at least, from

1905 to 1911, German diplomacy tried to drive a wedge between France and Great Britain in order to destroy the new friendship and the barrier which this new friendship presented to the ambitions of Junkerdom. In the first instance it succeeded to this extent—that the French Government, alarmed at the sabre-rattling, sacrificed its Foreign Minister, M. Delcassé. On the two subsequent occasions—known as the Casablanca and Agadir incidents—the French Governments of the day stood firm. France was not to be scared; she had made preparations; she had achieved confidence in herself.

The same methods, the sabre-rattling methods, were applied to Russia. And here it may be said that the Junkers have no respect for Russia—they have no respect for anybody or anything—but they have always had a wholesome dread of the Eastern Neighbour. Consequently, it was the corner-stone of the Bismarckian policy to keep on good terms with Russia. Also, it has been a settled rule in German diplomacy, not only to maintain this calculated and self-seeking policy, but to encourage Russia in war-like adventures outside of Europe. Thus would the Russians be kept busy, and their power made weak in the main direction, the direction in which it would be most obstructive to German ambitions.

For these reasons, and for many years,

Russia received the utmost encouragement to extend her dominions in Central Asia. By this policy of encouragement Germany profited in two ways; she kept Russia busy outside of Europe, and as the conquests of Russia in Central Asia became a menace to India this created bad feeling in Great Britain. Here was the Bismarckian policy again; to create bad feeling between the various European Powers; to divide, so that Germany might rule.

And just as Germany encouraged Russia to engage in weakening adventures in Central Asia, so she enticed Russia to adventures in the Far East; and for the same reasons. It was Germany that encouraged Russia to build the Siberian Railway; to push down into Manchuria; and finally to occupy Port Arthur, after having ousted the Japanese. This was at the end of the Chinese-Japanese war in 1894, and out of this aggressive policy arose the Russo-Japanese war ten year later.

Here, again, Russia received the utmost encouragement from Germany to engage in this war, and thus weaken herself in Europe. The German Emperor pledged himself to maintain order in Russian Poland if necessary, so that the troops in Warsaw might be despatched to the Far East. All the world knows the result of that adventure. The Russian navy was destroyed, her whole military system was shaken, and her

finances were very seriously crippled. It was thus possible for Germany not only to humiliate France in 1905—the ally of Russia—but to humiliate Russia herself in 1909.

This memorable incident arose out of the Revolution in Turkey that year, followed by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. The Servians protested against this annexation, and Russia, as the chief Slav Power, backed up the Servians. But diplomatic protests, in the circumstances, were valueless. Germany and Austria-Hungary, in combination, challenged Russia; withdraw your support from Servia, they said, or else we shall mobilize and that means war. Now, Russia was in no condition to meet this challenge, she was still weak after her struggle with Japan. In the result, she withdrew her support from Servia abruptly, to prevent war. In the eyes of Europe proud Russia was humiliated, and her ally and friend—France and Great Britain—were made to share in this humiliation.

No doubt the Junkers in Berlin, with the Emperor as the chief mover in this scheme, made the calculation that this set-back to the Triple Entente would have the result of breaking it up. France was to be taught that she could not rely for help upon Russia, and Great Britain was to learn that, in leaning upon a broken reed, her power to intervene in Europe was valueless.

That was the calculation, without doubt, but it was a miscalculation. The treatment of Russia was too brusque and insolent; its object was too obvious. The result was, therefore, that the Triple Entente, instead of being weakened, instead of becoming dissolved, was left closer, harder, more determined to withstand the aggressiveness of Germany. The Agadir incident, two years later, proved to demonstration that this was so.

Now, observe the outcome. The Junker diplomacy, maintained for many a year, had broken down. The three Great Powers, kept apart hitherto, and at loggerheads, by this diplomacy, were now firmly united. Not only so, but France, Russia and Great Britain were firmly united to withstand the aggressiveness of Germany, in Europe or anywhere else. Here was a combination, therefore, that was designed to place restrictions upon the ambitions of Germany to become a great Colonial Power, and the predominant World Power.

To the Junker mind such restrictions were intolerable, and not to be endured. Diplomacy had failed to destroy the Triple Entente. Very well; then the Junkers would fight. They would prepare by sea and land; they would select their moment. But the Junkers, in the penny-wise sense, are not precisely fools, and before

beginning the struggle there were several things that they greatly desired.

To increase the military strength of Turkey, and to attach the Turkish Government to the chariot wheels of Germany, formed part of the plan. The Young Turks had ambitions of their own, and by playing upon these ambitions the Junkers hoped—as they do still—that the Turks would take a hand in the game, upon their side. It was hoped and intended that Turkey, as a military Power, would worry Russia in Asia Minor, menace the small States in the Balkans, and make trouble for Great Britain, if necessary, in Egypt and India.

It was the earnest desire of the Junkers, however, that Great Britain should not intervene. The German Emperor and Admiral von Tirpitz know well the value of sea-power in a war on land, and they were most anxious to keep their brand-new navy intact, as far as possible. Russia and France were to be tackled first; France having been destroyed, her ally could be bought off, after a struggle in which Germany and Austria-Hungary had made the Russian Army suffer severely. But Great Britain must be kept out of it all in the first instance; her turn to be destroyed would come next.

The whole plan, however, as regards Turkey and Great Britain, has gone to pieces. To the immense surprise, and the no less intense

disgust, of the Dual Alliance—Germany and Austria-Hungary—the Turks were beaten flat by the combined small Balkan States. That upset the schemers, but it did not change their plans. Austria-Hungary was as determined as ever to destroy Servia, and carve her way to Salonika; the Junkers in Berlin were as determined as ever to become the great colonial and dominating World Power at the expense of France and Great Britain. The plans were not changed, but the execution of them was hurried forward.

Three things combined and contributed to make the plotters hurry. The Russian Navy, under British supervision, was growing fast in numbers and strength; and this Navy, in a war with Germany, could make things very uncomfortable in the Baltic. Then, again, the military and financial affairs of Russia had improved in an extraordinary degree, and with unexpected quickness. Still further, the immense effort made by Germany, after the Balkan wars, to increase her military strength had been quickly countered in France by the patriotic decision to make every man serve three years with the colours, instead of two years.

The Emperor of Germany and his Junkers now realised that the moment had come to strike; to counter Russia and destroy France. It was not, perhaps, the moment they would

have selected. But Russia was daily getting stronger, France was becoming more alive to her military and naval needs, and Austria-Hungary was becoming impatient in the knowledge that Greece and Servia were beginning to recover from the recent wars. The moment to strike had come. The only point to be cleared up was this: How would Great Britain act?

This question was anxiously considered at the German Embassy in London. Of that there is no doubt. The German Emperor gave special directions in this matter, and the whole system of espionage in Great Britain—a thoroughly organized and intricate system—was mobilized to supply an answer. And the answer supplied to the German Emperor by the German Ambassador in London may be briefly stated thus: "No. If Austria-Hungary employs the pretext of punishing Servia because of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo, the British Government will not move; and if Russia intervenes, followed by France, still Great Britain will remain neutral, under protest, and after a little blustering."

That was, in substance, the answer sent from London to Potsdam, and it gave great satisfaction. It indicated that one big obstacle in the path of Junker ambitions was neutralized in the coming war. France first, and then Great Britain—that has always been the method and

intention of the Junkers. Conceive the extreme surprise, therefore, and the intense disgust of the German Emperor when it was discovered, after all, that Great Britain was ready to fight, prepared to declare war against Germany, in order to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. What was this neutrality of Belgium? A mere scrap of paper! The German Chancellor and his august War Lord were inarticulate with rage because British statesmanship had applied a test, and thus taken the measure, of their aggressive policy.

It was to consummate this policy, a policy pursued unhaltingly for a quarter of a century, that the war was made. The intention was to destroy the power of France in Europe. As a result, Belgium and Holland, with all their seaports and colonies, would be at the mercy of Germany. In due time, therefore, Germany would be in a position to build such a strong navy, and to place it in such a good strategical position, that the conquest of Great Britain would be comparatively easy. Thus would Germany become, unquestionably, the greatest Military, Naval, Colonial and Industrial Power in the World.

This was the dream of Junkerdom; this was why the war was made.

# III. What will be the End?

It may seem to be premature, and to some extent presumptuous, to try to find an answer to this question. The allied armies operating in Belgium and France have not found it possible, as yet, to do more than turn the great wave of German invasion. Paris is not now threatened, although the French Government have retired to Bordeaux. The circumstances of the hour, in the western theatre of war, are certainly encouraging.

In effect, however, this war is only just beginning,—so far as the Allies are concerned—and if the necessity arises it can be, and shall be, continued almost indefinitely. That fact must be grasped firmly before we can arrive at a reasoned answer to the question: "What will be the end?" Short views, in this case, are only misleading views. We must take long views; and we must try to understand also what are the conditions, in a vast modern international conflict, which lead up to victory for one side, and that bring defeat—slowly, it may be, but surely—to the other side.

In many important respects this war is

unique. Taking together the number of Great Powers involved, the millions of men in the field, the rapidity of the movements, and the scale of destructiveness, there is none of the old wars that can be properly compared with the present war. Another noteworthy point is this: the nations engaged in this conflict are, for the most part, highly organised, industrial, complex nations. It is not now as in the old wars, when the nations engaged were simple organisms, each with a purely agricultural population. They were almost self-dependent then, they were capable of an easy recuperation. The armies went into winter quarters, and the campaign began, almost where it left off, in the following spring.

Yet it was true then, and it is still truer to-day, that victory crowned the efforts of the side that exhibited the greatest staying power. No doubt there is good fortune and bad fortune in war; no doubt a nation—as at Sadowa and Sedan—has been overwhelmed past recovery by a single great military disaster. But for the most part, either in a battle or over a whole campaign, it is staying-power that decides the issue. War is a supreme process of exhaustion, as between the nations engaged. And this exhaustion may arise in a financial, military, or economic form; all these may combine, indeed, to weaken and destroy the staying-power of a nation at war.

Now, let us consider the matter, specifically, in relation to the present great conflict of the nations. Take the case of Austria-Hungary. Here is a state—one cannot call it a nation—with many outward appearances of great strength. A population of some 50,000,000; an army, when fully embodied, of 3,500,000; and a yearly revenue of nearly £200,000,000. Considered in the abstract, therefore, and in the form of statistics, Austria-Hungary appears to be a most formidable military Power. Her rulers have thought so; her German ally has thought so.

But is Austria-Hungary in a position to stand a prolonged strain? There is no reason to think so. Her financial position for many years, and especially since the annexation of Bosnia and Hertzegovina in 1909, has been extremely shaky. She has found the greatest difficulty in borrowing money, and her financial distress was aggravated by the mobilizations imposed upon her by the recent Balkan Wars. As regards her finances, therefore, this war is to Austria-Hungary a gambler's throw. By employing paper money she can carry on for a few months, but not for any length of time.

Equally shaky is the economic position of Austria-Hungary. How very quickly the Dual Monachy can feel the stress of adverse economic conditions was demonstrated five

years ago at the time of the Turkish Revolution. The Turks imposed a boycott upon goods made in Austria-Hungary, their shipping facilities were curtailed, and at once there was distress. Now, in the present war, all these things are aggravated.

It is in the political sphere, however, that Austria-Hungary is weakest. Not only is there perpetual jealousy between the two halves of the Dual Monarchy, there is also strong disagreement between the many varied races. Politically, the country is covered with fissures, racial and religious fissures, and we may assure ourselves that these will widen under any prolonged stress. Even now, they weaken the military power of Austria-Hungary. Not battalions merely, but whole divisions of the army cannot be trusted to fight.

So far as the Dual Monarchy is concerned, therefore, a prolonged war, with ultimate victory, is practically impossible. It is highly improbable, indeed, that the armies of Austria-Hungary are strong enough for their immediate task. Their army on the Drina has been disastrously defeated by the Servians at Shabatz and Semlin, while their army in Galicia has been defeated, even more disastrously, by the Russians. That is a bad beginning, and we may assure ourselves that worse remains behind. Germany will find, and that soon, the

extreme rashness of going tiger-shooting with that conglomeration of races which we know politically as Austria-Hungary.

And what about Germany herself? Is she in a position to continue the struggle for one, two or three years? Now, in seeking to give an answer to this question we must not be too optimistic. Germany knows now, if she did not know when she declared war, that she is fighting for her life. If it so happens that her back is uncovered, so to say, by the overwhelming defeat of Austria-Hungary, this knowledge will be pressed home even more sharply. And if Italy joins the Allies eventually, as is more than probable, Germany will realize that she is fighting absolutely alone, that her back is now to the wall, and that she can expect little mercy.

Will Germany give up the struggle, in these circumstances, or will she continue the uphill fight to the bitterest end? That is a question that can alone be answered by events. And the answer will depend to a large extent upon the temper of the German people when they are made to suffer as Belgium and France have suffered, and when they realise how grossly they have been misinformed and misled. The German people have been taught to expect victory with the utmost confidence. Now, that is a poor preparation for a series of defeats, followed

by an invasion of their beloved Fatherland. How will the Germans bear themselves in these circumstances? Will they love the Kaiser as they are supposed to love him now?

One thing, at least, is certain. It is certain that the Junkers, and all the castes and classes that comprise Junkerdom, will fight to the bitter end. For them it is victory or extinction; they must do or die. Nor can it be denied that the fighting strength of Germany, immediately available, is very great. The population is over 65,000,000, and the first line army may be reckoned as 1,500,000. To this must be added the Landwehr 1,800,000 and the Landsturm 800,000. There is also a very large number of men, now being trained, who have not hitherto been called upon to join the army.

Taken by itself, therefore, and without reference to the combined numerical strength of its opponents, Germany possesses in her army an extremely powerful instrument to impose her will. But apart from numbers the peculiar effectiveness of the German army lies in its organisation. It is organised and specialised down to the smallest detail; ready always to take the field. There has probably never been, in the long story of human effort, such a perfectly contrived smoothly working machine as the army which the Germans have so rapidly placed in the fighting line.

But it has to be noted, at the same time, that this machine, at once complex and powerful, has been contrived for special use in a special manner. For the necessities of Germany—two frontiers to guard against enemies possessing great numerical preponderance—require that she must deploy her forces, and deliver her blows with combined strength and swiftness. To bring all her strength to bear at the earliest moment, to throw everything into the scales, to employ all her reserves in the decisive direction in the first weeks of the war—these are strategical necessities imposed upon Germany. And to this end her machine-army has been constructed.

What will happen, however, now that the German plans have gone wrong, now that their time-table has become disarranged, and the Allied Forces in France refuse to be beaten and dispersed? What will happen if, as seems more than probable, the Austrian army is soundly thrashed by Russia and driven back on Vienna? In what position will the Germans find themselves when their frontier is uncovered by the overwhelming defeat of Austria-Hungary, and the road to Berlin is left open to the combined and converging march of the vast Russian armies? All these things are possible, even probable, and if and when they happen the Germans, caught between two fires, will find themselves in a position of extreme danger.

If we assume, on the other hand, that events do not move with this rapidity, that Germany extricates herself from any immediate overwhelming, that she is enabled to concentrate her strength for a defensive campaign on her own territory. How long would she be able to maintain such a defensive against the combined forces of the Allies? That is a difficult question to answer. When a man is fighting to keep himself out of the bankruptcy court he struggles harder, with many a shift and resource, than even his friends believe to be possible. And in a defensive war the Germans would be fighting against bankruptcy—political, military, economic and moral bankruptcy. They will use up, we must suppose, every ounce of their strength, they will call up their reserves to the last man.

Let us, therefore, take the long view, so that we may be on the safe side. Let us assume that this will be a protracted war, a war of exhaustion, a war in which all the reserve forces of all the nations engaged will be called up. It is from this point of view that we obtain the most encouragement; it is just here, in the struggle of the reserve forces, that we can assure ourselves with confidence that we shall win. We cannot say just how; above all, we cannot say just when; but in the last great wrestle of the reserve forces, the reserve forces

of all kinds, the Allies must come out on top triumphant.

Consider who they are, the three central Powers of the Alliance, and the resources, at once vast and various, that they possess for use in this conflict. In a war upon a great scale, such as the present war, there are three forms of power that exercise a dominating influence—sea-power, land-power and money-power. Taken singly these various powers have great influence, but in combination, upon the biggest scale, they are irresistible.

Now, in the case of the Allies they are combined upon a supreme scale. Great Britain has the war-ships that give sea-power; Russia has the vast armies that give land-power; and France has the money-power in a supreme degree. Each of the three Powers, no doubt, contributes ships, men and money to the common stock; but each one of the three is supreme in its possession of the three most necessary things for maintaining to a victorious finish a prolonged war, upon the biggest scale. Upon these things, even although they are material things, we can confidently base our belief in final victory for the Allies. They are all needful in a supreme degree, and the Allies possess them all in a supreme degree. In ships, men, and money the resources of the Allies are unchallengeable.

But the supremacy does not end here. In a prolonged struggle the moral element comes into play. An army may be contrived, like a machine, to deliver a swift blow, and that the German army is so contrived there is no doubt. It has been elaborately prepared to strike a knock-out blow in France, and then by quick change of front, to parry a heavy blow on the Russian frontier. But can the German army endure a prolonged battering and shattering, in round after round? Of the Austria-Hungary army we can say at once that it possesses no such quality of endurance. Its *morale* is poor, it is composed of various races, there is no unity of ideal. If such an army does not go to pieces at the first shock, it will go to pieces under a prolonged strain.

We cannot, with the same confidence, deny the quality of moral endurance to the German army. Events will supply the answer. But this, at least, we can say with assurance, that any army that has been trained to be a machine is not likely to endure prolonged battering, and survive triumphantly. Human nature will assert itself; and as the human nature in the German army has not been trained to be self-reliant and self-resourceful under defeat, its *morale* under the strain of a long war must be regarded as doubtful. The courage of the German army is not in doubt; the courage of

a great host trained to believe in its invincibility. But we may well doubt whether the German armies when driven back, when hemmed in upon their own territory, will maintain their courage in a long struggle month after month, year after year.

For it is to this endurance unto the end, however distant that end may be, that the Allies have pledged themselves. And that they have the material resources for such a struggle is certain. Nor is it less certain that their armies have the moral qualities necessary, while the peoples behind the armies have every moral incentive to fight on for a decisive victory at the finish. The Germans themselves, by their dastardly and inhuman actions, have sharpened to the keenest edge the moral qualities of the instrument that will destroy them in the end. They have endeavoured, of deliberate purpose, to terrify the nations with whom they are at war, by the ruthless employment of fire and sword, of bombs from the air and mines in the open sea. They thought thus, and sought thus, to destroy the *morale* of their opponents.

A fatal miscalculation. Wherever the barbarous methods have been employed at their worst, and notably in Belgium, the determination to resist enduringly, even to extinction, has become a moral inspiration, a national faith. This is easy to understand. The Germans, in

their policy of ruthlessness, have over-reached themselves. They have demonstrated to their opponents—and to neutral States no less—what kind of treatment awaits them if Germany is victorious. Their national independence will disappear, their private liberties will be curtailed, they will exist upon sufferance, they will be the hirelings and slaves of a triumphant Junkerdom. Could the nations opposing this insolent and ruthless aggression receive any stronger moral incentive to persevere to the end?

Nor is the end, under such circumstances, in the least degree doubtful. It is not conceivable, it is not thinkable, that Great Britain, France and Russia with all the material advantages they possess for endurance, and all the moral incentives, will be stamped into the ground by the Junkers. We may not persuade ourselves that the end will come soon; it is much wiser to believe that Germany—even if Austria-Hungary fails her and sues for peace—will struggle long before she submits unreservedly to the Allies. In the end, however, the two Powers who have set Europe on fire must be made, and they shall be made, to surrender unconditionally. The business of destroying the Junkerism of these two Powers must be accomplished finally and completely.

This is necessary to be said plainly. For in the course of the struggle, and when destruction is

confronting them, all the diplomatic forces of Austria-Hungary and Germany will be mobilised to retrieve in the council-chamber what has been lost in the stricken field. If they cannot obtain a military triumph they will seek to achieve a triumph of diplomatic intrigue; at the worst they will try to mitigate, if not to avert, the consequences of their failure in ruthless aggressiveness. In particular, the two dynasties, the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns, will try every shift and scheme to maintain themselves in power.

Shall they be able to do so? As regards Austria-Hungary, the outlook, as regards the Hapsburg dynasty, is extremely dubious. The Dual Monarchy, frail in its foundations at the best, will go to pieces, almost certainly, under the strain of a disastrous war. Hungary is jealous of Austria, the Magyar and the German have little in common, and the whole artificial structure of the Dual Monarchy will collapse, probably at an early date. When the Russians begin to threaten Vienna and the Servians reach Budapest, as in due time they will, we must expect to see panic, riots, and a probable revolution. When all is finished, when the Allies impose their terms of peace, it is more than likely that the Dual Monarchy, as such, will have ceased to exist.

As regards the Hohenzollern dynasty, and its

position at the end of the war, we may not speak with the same certitude. But this, at least, is certain; the German people will learn many things that are hidden from them just now. And when they realise how they have been fed with lies, and misled to an overwhelming disaster, they will shriek with indignation. They may demand a scapegoat, even, in the person of the German Emperor. There have been nations before now, arrogant and confident of victory, who have broken their idols to pieces under the sharp edge of hopes disappointed. In any case, Prussian ascendancy and Junker ideals will be destroyed by the wrathful German people themselves when they are made to understand, by the stresses of war, how completely they have been befooled. And in this connection we must not forget that the South German States have never been thoroughly reconciled to the ascendancy and methods of Prussia and its King.

But whatever may happen to crowns and dynasties this thing is certain: At the end of the war, and as the result of their victory, the Allies will re-arrange the map of Europe. Not with timid readjustment, but comprehensively, and with the intention to make an enduring peace. Some of these changes are already discernible. The two provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, lost in 1870, will be returned to France. It is plain, also, that the Poles on the eastern frontier provinces of Germany—several

millions—will be incorporated in the new Kingdom of Poland, under the suzerainty of Russia. The Vistula will be the line of the new frontier. Nor is it improbable that Schleswig-Holstein, lost to Denmark in 1864, will now be returned to her by the Allies. As regards the German colonies, the Japanese have undertaken to turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chau and return it to China; while it may be taken as certain that in Africa — east and west — in Samoa, New Guinea, and the islands of the Southern Pacific, the British Empire will take charge in future. Last, but not least, Heligoland must return to Great Britain.

As regards Austria-Hungary the political readjustments, if not so clearly discernible, will be even more drastic. It is extremely doubtful, as has already been suggested, whether Hungary and Austria will continue together as a dual monarchy. In any case, they will both find that the Allies, in making readjustments after the war, will delimit new frontiers. As in Germany, so in Austria, there are a large number of Poles in the eastern provinces, and these, also, will be incorporated in the new Kingdom of Poland. Besides this, another new Slav Kingdom will be created, in association with Servia, and this will include Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slavonia. It is not improbable, also, that this Slav Kingdom will embrace

Montenegro, with an outlet into the Adriatic at Spizza and Cattaro. In the Dual Monarchy there are about three million Roumanians, and this will justify Roumania in demanding an extension of territory. Then there is Italy. If the Italian Government join in the war, as no doubt they will at the right moment, the Italians will recover from Austria, their old oppressor, at least Trieste and the Trentino.

Such are the outstanding political changes that will result from the war. The proud will be brought low, and the oppressors and aggressors will be stripped of their ill-gotten possessions. Wherefore, the economic changes will also be considerable. At the end of the war Germany and Austria-Hungary will be bankrupt States; not only morally, but also financially bankrupt. For several years Austria-Hungary has been on the verge of bankruptcy; now her people must contemplate the certainty that all her affairs, political, economic and financial, will pass into liquidation. That they will ever be established again upon the old basis is impossible. Not for many a year, at least, will the Austrians and Hungarians recover their trade and re-establish their finances.

From Germany and Austria-Hungary, in the measure of their competence to pay, the Allies will demand an indemnity. It is somewhat difficult to see how the latter will be able to pay

very much. But with Germany it is different. No doubt, she is piling up an enormous debt at present, issuing paper money in enormous quantities, and spending the gold which has been sedulously hoarded to finance this very war. At the end of a prolonged struggle the German treasury will be empty, the State will be bankrupt. Still, it is inevitable that the Allies should demand an indemnity, and an extremely heavy indemnity. The destruction in Belgium alone would justify, not merely reparation, but the heaviest punishment. The German people have acquiesced in the criminality of this war, and they must pay for its crimes.

That they will be required to meet the bill, in all manner of financial and economic forms, is an absolute certainty. Already German shipping has been swept off the seas by the British Fleet. Her mercantile marine consists of nearly 2,500 ships with a tonnage of over 5,000,000, and all these ships, with the wealth they represent, are either lost to Germany, or shut up in ports. Nor is it possible to believe that the German carrying trade, passengers and cargo, will be resumed after the war. Some of it is lost for ever, and not for many a year will there be an approximate return to the old activities. The German shipping lines, even now, are confronted with bankruptcy.

The same fate will overtake German trade

and manufactures. They are, at the present time, practically at a standstill. The workmen have gone to the war, no money exists for industries, credit is not to be obtained, and all the outside markets are as good as closed. What this means to Germany is roughly indicated by the fact that, in 1912, her imports were valued at £550,800,000, and her exports at £454,900,000. No doubt, in the future, Germany will still be a great industrial nation. But for many years, for more than a decade, she will find herself heavily handicapped, sharply crippled, as the result of her defeat in this war.

For German trade and manufactures have been established upon credit, and the credit of a nation with an empty treasury, burdened with a heavy indemnity, shorn of her possessions at home and abroad, and all her affairs in disarray—why, the financiers of Europe will look at her askance. And there is another form of credit which will be lost to a defeated Germany. When a State possesses a vast army and a great navy it is in the position to exercise pressure, diplomatic and economic pressure, upon small States, from Constantinople to Peking. This was done by Germany, to the great benefit of her trade. But this pressure will not, in future, be employable to the same degree, in the old arrogant manner.

It will be a discredited Germany that will

emerge from this war. And a chastened Germany we must hope.

In any case, Europe will obtain, by the extinction of Junkerism, a long and welcome peace. They have rattled their sabres, these Junkers, and strutted arrogantly before the nations for half a century. But there is an end to all tyrannies, and the end of Junkerdom is now assured. Heavy has been the price which Europe has had to pay for the ascendancy of this ambitious and arrogant military oligarchy, with its head-quarters at Potsdam. Terrible is the toll which Europe is paying now in the combined effort to destroy for ever the power and the ideals of Junkerdom. But this destruction was a necessity, if the free nations of Europe were to retain their freedom, and if our civilization was to maintain itself alive in the midst of an unscrupulous and ruthless military caste, led by the German Emperor. And the destruction of Junkerdom may be achieved even sooner, perhaps, than some of us dare to hope. But sooner or later there will be one end to this war. The Allies will triumph comprehensively and decisively. They have aid and assurances of all kinds—material, moral, spiritual. And when this triumph comes Europe again shall be able to say thankfully, without impiety—

"GOD'S IN HIS HEAVEN; ALL'S RIGHT WITH THE WORLD."

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